

A MODEL FOR INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
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Special Forces**



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A Model For Inter-Agency Coordination
During Military Operations

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

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This monograph proposes a four step model for coordination planning between other government agencies (OGAs) and the U.S. Military during military operations. It discusses the need for such a model based upon the operations involving OGAs in a detailed report on Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 1993 through 1995 in Haiti. Military operations in Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY confirm the doctrinal requirement for close cooperation between military forces and OGAs. This operation in particular involved many OGAs that required integration and coordination during the crisis action planning.

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The author recommends that military planners review GCIP and include it as doctrine to help planners with the difficult task of coordination planning. It also recommends that the model be taught or explained to those most common OGAs.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

What guides U.S. military leaders and planners in all types of operations is doctrine. It is the foundation of U.S. Army operations and although it is ever changing, it requires prudent practice. Doctrine is defined in FM 100-5 as “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. Army doctrine is authoritative, but requires judgment in application.”¹ Other government agencies (OGAs) base their operations or projects on policy not doctrine, especially not Army doctrine. Therein lies one problem this monograph addresses. The problem arises when an Army led operation is supported by other government agencies without a command and control structure incorporating other government agencies. The result can be lots of OGA action without centralized control or more importantly centralized coordination adding to an already difficult military operation.

There just does not seem to be an effective system or process for integrating interagency operations. Some of the agencies, particularly those normally supporting military intelligence operations, have been more successful at integrating the products or services from both the military and agency perspectives. Over time, the relationship has grown to permanent liaison cells either at the agency or at the regional military Commander in Chief (CINC) level. For instance, there is a political advisor (POLAD)

assigned to a CINC's headquarters representing the State Department who, usually an ambassador grade employee, acts as an advisor to the CINC. Other agencies also have permanent liaison with the military at this level and interface with the military on a daily basis and in times of crisis or during execution of a military operation. This monograph will describe in detail the complexity of a recent military operation, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. The importance of this section of the monograph is to show an example of how OGAs can assist a military operation. It will be made clear how important it is to have all agency activities coordinated during the sometimes very dangerous situations.

Different types of Army operations exist where interface with OGAs is probable. The Army defines operations in generally two categories, war and operations other than war (OOTW). Recently, over the past ten years or so, doctrine has adapted to include operations other than war because of the increase in OOTW missions. Although the main emphasis of the military is the defense of the nation and support of the national objectives, OOTW have become "increasingly common in the post-Cold War strategic security environment."² "In fact, since 1988, the number of peace operations has more than doubled, with each succeeding one being more complex than the last."³ However, today the Army is searching for a new term to replace OOTW that better describes these other operations. The term "OOTW" is to some degree controversial. The controversy probably exists because of its ambiguity and funny sounding acronym. In an effort to find a new term, the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command issued guidance limiting the use of the term OOTW in 1995.⁴ More recently, several high ranking officers have mentioned

that the term OOTW will remain the choice acronym due to its acceptance in joint doctrine and overall familiarity.⁵

Two of the Army's manuals that specifically address OOTW and the subordinate operations known as peace operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are FM 100-5, *Operations* and FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*. Although these manuals address OOTW, they do not provide the needed detail for military planners. Emerging doctrine tentatively separates these operations into stability and security types of operations.⁶ As these complex operations become more prevalent, they include other government agencies in support of the military operations. A clear lack of detailed guidance in the form of doctrine leaves military planners and commanders alike left to do the best they can to coordinate the many different government agency functions. The military is usually put in the position to coordinate these agency functions in times of crisis, when time is short and action is required immediately. During many recent operations, the military provides the leadership in an effort to focus all of the agencies to a common purpose during a military operation.

In war, the other type of military operation, there is clear guidance in joint manuals describing the combat support of other government agencies. One manual in particular discusses the wartime relationship between OGAs and the military, Joint Pub 1-03.32, *Combat Support Agency Assessment System*.⁷ The lack of OOTW or peace operations doctrine that specifically discusses inter-agency or other government agency support to military operations is a void that wastes time and precious resources when planning these

operations. Thus the focus of this monograph is to explore and study the inter-agency relationships during a military led operation other than war.

Recently, in the post-Cold War era, the military has been charged with a wide range of peacetime responsibilities.⁸ One important part of the reason the military is tasked with meeting these peacetime challenges is that the military has “unique capabilities not found in other government agencies and organizations.”⁹ These capabilities include:

A versatile command structure, rapid high-volume global mobility, organic worldwide communications, regional expertise (e.g., in language, culture, economics, and medicine), and the ability to protect and defend itself and those organizations and individuals with whom it works.¹⁰

All military operations propel political considerations. “However, military operations other than war are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities.”¹¹ Commanders are responsible for establishing the secure and stable environment, and enforcing the peace while avoiding casualties. Army commanders are also responsible for coordinating the activities of the OGAs to ensure they are deconflicted in time, space and purpose and manage the total impact of all of them with respect to overall mission success. How did the Army become the one to manage this set of circumstances? How can the Army be responsible for the overall actions of the operation when the other government agencies do not follow Army doctrine and operate off their own policies? Where does a commander or planner turn to find out what these agencies bring in support of the specific types of operations such as those in Haiti? These are just some of the questions this monograph will answer.

Operations in Haiti, 1993-1995, provide an opportunity to study the inter-agency relations with the military, primarily the Army, during a recent major undertaking.

Although these operations were joint and combined in nature, this study will concentrate on the Army relationship with other government agencies because it was an Army led operation at first and later a joint operation and even later yet, a multi-national operation. The events in Haiti also provide an opportunity to analyze a recent operation that included many different types of agencies and departments. This was an operation where each of these agencies had their own objectives in support of the military mission of restoring democracy to the tattered country.

The Crisis: Background of Military Operations in Haiti

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the United States-led multinational force (MNF) operation supporting the return of President Jean Bertrand Aristide to Haiti, began in September 1994. Although attempts at diplomatic solutions and even some military planning began much earlier, this monograph will concentrate on the 1994 military response and the OGAs involved with this mission. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY included over 20,000 service men and women from all services including the U.S. Coast Guard and elements of 24 other nations.¹² Many other agencies were involved in Haiti contributing to the success, even before military actions were planned. Since Haiti was within the area of responsibility and operation of the United States Atlantic Command, Norfolk Virginia, the operation was under the command of the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM) Admiral Paul David Miller, USN.¹³

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Colin L. Powell, USA, alerted CINCUSACOM on April 1, 1993 for a possible contingency operation in Haiti.¹⁴ The potential for U.S. involvement became apparent after the overthrow of the popularly

elected government of President Aristide by Lieutenant General Raul Cedras, who led a repressive regime from September, 1991 until September 19, 1994.¹⁵ From that point on, many attempts at various diplomatic solutions were tried with the help of other government agencies and departments.

First Military Action

The first military operation began in October 1993 in support of the international embargo enforced by Joint Task Force 120 (JTF 120). This was a Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) that was designed to increase pressure on Lieutenant General Cedras by ensuring that the embargo in place was observed.¹⁶ Fuel oil was the most important item to Cedras and thus the target for the U.S. led embargo. The purpose of the embargo was to immobilize the country's transportation system and apply pressure on Cedras. The embargo was not against the people of Haiti, but it did affect them greatly. The United States was careful not to embargo humanitarian items such as cooking oil, to show that the embargo had a specific purpose and was not directed against the general population.

JTF 120 was activated on October 16, 1993 to conduct the MIO and to support a possible Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) of American citizens and selected third country nationals in March and April 1994.¹⁷ The command ship was the USS *Nassau*. On board were the JTF 120 commander, staff and a reinforced Marine battalion (Special Marine Air Ground Task Force or SPMAGTF), with its regimental staff and helicopters. Their mission was to conduct the MIO by boarding ships and monitoring the sea lanes in and out of Haitian ports.

When the author joined JTF 120, there were about nine ships deployed covering about thirteen "boxes" or maritime areas of operation for which the JTF was responsible.¹⁸ The ships were moved from one operating area ("box") to another to cover the entire area of operation depending on the amount of ship traffic in each area. The ships conducted boardings searching for contraband and redirected them to other ports outside of Haiti if appropriate.

One of the most important tasks for JTF 120 was building a contingency operation consisting of the emergency extraction of American citizens from the Port-au-Prince area. Special operations units sent planners and pre-positioned important equipment aboard the USS *Nassau* in order to be able to conduct the NEO, if necessary. The main force of Marines, the Special Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF), was capable of conducting this operation as planned with some assistance from special operations forces and had trained specifically for a contingency plan to fly into the assembly area at night and secure the safe extraction of Americans and other key personnel. The commander had several different options; the Marines were ready to conduct all planned activities and continuously rehearsed and trained for them. The training included limited visibility and nighttime flying by the helicopter crews and fast-rope infiltration training (a technique of sliding down a special rope from a hovering helicopter) by the Marines.

The MIO combined a strong naval presence with some ship boarding personnel to search for fuel being smuggled into Haiti. This strong naval presence was successful in maintaining the restrictions on fuel, the main embargoed item from the sea. However, the naval MIO alone was unable to completely seal the country from smugglers. Petroleum

products continued to be smuggled across the border from the Dominican Republic by truck or foot.¹⁹ The border between Haiti and The Dominican Republic was not as secure as one might assume, with about 15 miles of it virtually unguarded leaving it open for small quantities of fuel to be carried across. It was easy to cross undetected, especially if the guards on the Haiti side were paid ahead of time with either money or fuel. The fuel for sale on the city streets was usually in small quantities and sold in containers by the liter/gallon. In light of the fact that some fuel did cross the border, the overall MIO was dubbed successful. However, the reality on the streets of Port-au-Prince was that fuel was available for those who could pay the price.

Military Action Increases

CINCUSACOM established a second JTF on May 16, 1994, in order to conduct migrant interdiction at sea, and provide administrative processing and services at migrant camps. The largest of these sites was at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO).²⁰ This separate JTF was necessary to contain the massive exodus of Haitians which resulted from two main causes. First, many Haitians wanted to escape the repression of the Cedras government. Second, ironically enough, the embargo forced the poor people to pay higher prices for the smuggled fuel. Without fuel, many businesses had to close and people were put out of work. Others were forced to illegally purchase fuel to maintain their businesses. This fuel embargo had a much more devastating effect on the people of Haiti, but did not directly affect Lieutenant General Cedras and his government.²¹ While this was primarily a United States effort there were ongoing United Nations resolutions and diplomatic solutions leading to the Governor's Island Accord.

Prior to the United States led MIO, the United Nations sponsored its own mission. When Cedras overthrew President Aristide in September 1991 the United Nations began its involvement at once. In October 1993, the UN deployed an advance party of a foreign internal defense (FID) mission led by the U.S. called the Haitian Assistance and Advisory Group (HAAG). Because the term "nation building" was not a politically correct one at the time, the term FID was used even though it was not exactly doctrinally correct. The term "nation building" created a controversy because the U.S. Government does not send military forces to build nations, it is simply not the military's mission. Second, Haiti was already a recognized nation and did not ask for the U.S. or any other country to rebuild it, they just wanted to oust Cedras and replace the democratically elected President. The HAAG deployment followed the passing of UN Resolution 867 on September 23, 1993 which authorized an expanded mission to support the transition from LTG Cedras to President Aristide.²² On October 14, 1993 the HAAG arrived in harbor of Port-au-Prince, Haiti aboard the USS *Harlan County* (LST-1196). The ship was turned away by an angry crowd indicating a less than permissive environment for the military advisors.²³ The crowd, many of them "attachés," was heard chanting "Somalia, Somalia." The obvious purpose of this chanting was to remind the observers of the casualties the U.S. Army Rangers had taken in Mogadishu on the third of October, less than two weeks earlier. That violent incident followed an unsuccessful and costly direct action (DA) mission by SOF in which helicopters were shot down, U.S. personnel were captured, and others were killed during rescue attempts.²⁴

Invasion Plans Begun

As a result of the failed HAAG mission and the humiliating pull back of the USS *Harlan County*, the U.S. began extensive alternative planning for a more aggressive mission in Haiti. CINCUSACOM stood up the XVIII Airborne Corps with the 82d Airborne Division as JTF 180 and JTF 190 respectively, to plan and conduct forced entry and other contingency options. These JTF's were formed to meet the requirements of two different USACOM operations plans (OPLANS) for more aggressive military operations (OPLAN 2370-95) and permissive entry operations (OPLAN 2380-95).²⁵

OPLAN 2370-95 began as a compartmented top secret plan in November 1993 and was submitted to CINCUSACOM for approval on 20 June 1994. This compartmentalization will be discussed later in depth because of its impact on the planning by all of the many diverse units involved. It was commonly believed that the top secret compartmentation and close hold nature of the planning was due to the Presidents' desire to explore every effort to reach a peaceful settlement politically before undertaking any armed intervention in Haiti. Further, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) wanted to conduct prudent planning without any exposure that might undermine the political means of settlement. The plan published was OPLAN 2370-95 with JTF 180 consisting of mainly elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, commanded by Lieutenant General Henry Shelton.²⁶

In June 1994, OPLAN 2380-95 was written using the crisis action planning process because of the "time compressed environment" for the multinational force option.²⁷ This operations plan focused on the permissive entry option with a multinational force made up

of countries from the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS). The two major distinct differences between this plan and OPLAN 2370-95 were the accessibility of information for all planners and the rules of engagement that would govern the use of force by the JTF. OPLAN 2380-95 was the JTF 190 option with the main force consisting of elements of the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, commanded by Major General David Meade.²⁸

In Belem, Brazil, on June 7, 1993, the OAS formulated a plan following the return of President Aristide to Haiti, asking the UN Security Council to establish a Multinational Peacekeeping Force to assist Haiti.²⁹ On June 16, 1993, the Department of State (DOS) authorized the reduction of U.S. embassy staff personnel in Haiti, reducing the total number of official embassy personnel from 118 to 75.³⁰ Five days later, the Pentagon announced the deployment of U.S. personnel along the Haiti and Dominican Republic border under the command of JTF 120 to broadcast "Radio Democracy" and to reinforce the embargo.³¹

The migrant flow out of Haiti increased and led CINCUSACOM on July 3, 1994 to designate the 10th Mountain Division as JTF 190. On July 6, the USS *Inchon* (LPH-12), Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), sailed to the Caribbean with 2,000 Marines ready to evacuate U.S. citizens from Haiti. On July 12, the USS *MT Whitney* (LCC-20), a *SECOND* Fleet command ship, sailed for Haitian waters.³²

The U.S. representative to the UN, Ambassador Madeline Albright, announced on July 14, 1994 that eleven nations had pledged to support the Multinational Force (MNF) deployment to Haiti once the military junta was removed and President Aristide was

restored as the President of Haiti. The next day, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali announced the Security Council had authorized a coalition force of 15,000 troops to provide peacekeeping in Haiti.³³

On July 20, 1994, Ambassador Albright asked the UN Security Council to support a U.S. led multinational force using "all means necessary" to remove Lieutenant General Cedras. The UN authorization to allow the U.S. to use "all means necessary" came in the form of Resolution 940 on July 31, 1994.³⁴ The USS *Wasp* (LHA-1) with a SPMAGTF and the amphibious readiness group (ARG) arrived in the Haiti area of operations and relieved the USS *Inchon* (LPH-12) ARG on August 11, 1994. The mission of the SPMAGTF was to conduct non-combatant evacuation. At this point the U.S. had sufficient forces in place to conduct all of the planned contingency operations in Haiti. The next major event occurred when the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) ministers announced their support for the now UN approved, U.S. led invasion of Haiti on August 30, 1994.³⁵ By this date the Vatican was the only state that still recognized the coup government.³⁶

In September 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry authorized CINCUSACOM to predeploy U.S. forces. The commanders of both JTF 180 and JTF 190 began to preposition forces to execute the combination of OPLANs 2370-95 and 2380-95 which became the "OPLAN 2380 plus (+) option." The support structure for the operation was put into place with the interim support bases being established at GTMO and the island of Great Inagua. The prepositioning of troops began to fill the ISBs on land as loaded ships sailed for Haiti waters. An aircraft carrier, the USS *Eisenhower* (CV-69), void of its

normal payload of naval aviation assets, was loaded with various Army and special operations helicopters and sailed for Haiti on September 14 with U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) on board.³⁷

CINCUSACOM ordered CJTF 180 to assign the Naval Forces (NAVFOR) commander a SPMAGTF mission in the small port town of Cap Haitien and both the Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), and the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic (COMMARFORLANT) to supply forces as needed. Once the change of operational control went to CJTF 180, CINCUSACOM directed that CJTF 120 take on duties as a subordinate task force, DTF 185, which was the naval component (NAVFOR) for the forced entry option to invade Haiti.³⁸

ADM Henry H. Mauz, Jr., Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), directed an additional aircraft carrier, without its normal complement of aircraft, the USS *America* (CV-66), to VADM Jay L. Johnson, Commander *SECOND* Fleet.³⁹

The USS *America* unloaded a Joint Special Operations Task Force, designated Joint Task Force 188, in Norfolk from 10 to 13 September.

The *America* and JTF 188 departed Norfolk on 13 September, in support of OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. JTF 188 was comprised of approximately 2200 personnel from elements of the United States Special Operations Command, headquartered at Macdill Air Force Base, Florida. USSOCOM forces included elements of the 75th Ranger Regiment, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, US Army Special Operations Command, and the Naval Special Warfare Command. Equipment included standard light weapons, HUMVEES, CH-47 CHINOOK helicopters, several variants of the UH-60 helicopter, and other light observation helicopters. *America* and JTF 188 were positioned in the Joint Operations Area, off the Haitian coast, until 19 October, when they were ordered home.⁴⁰

While the deployment phase of the forced entry operation was underway, President Clinton sent a negotiating team on September 16 to explain the consequences of military action to General Cedras and try to settle the problem without bloodshed. This team was

led by former President Jimmy Carter; former CJCS, General Colin Powell; and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The group met with Lieutenant General Cedras in the Presidential Palace in Port-au-Prince to persuade him to step down. The invasion force was enroute and prepared to forcibly remove Cedras if necessary.⁴¹

Last Minute Switch

At precisely 182201Z September 1994, while in GTMO, Cuba, aboard the USS *MT Whitney* (LCC-20), CJTF 180, Lieutenant General Shelton was given command of the Joint Operational Area (JOA). The National Command Authority (NCA) issued an order to CINCUSACOM to execute OPLAN 2370-95 and set the H-hour at 190401Z September 1994.⁴² As the forces began their final preparations for the invasion, a last minute settlement by the negotiating team prompted Lieutenant General Cedras to step down immediately from power and eventually leave Haiti. CINCUSACOM ordered the forced entry operation to cease and the execution of the permissive entry option, OPLAN 2380+ to begin.⁴³

The nonpermissive options included the 1st and 2nd United States Ranger Battalions, just two of the special operations forces earmarked for operations in Haiti. Along with other special operations forces, some of them were sent to the USS *America* (CV-66) to prepare for execution of their mission.⁴⁴ The assault was going to be "swift and violent, but probably not too bloody."⁴⁵ Although, the enemy was thought to be "decrepit and unmotivated," the huge numbers of aircraft (300-500) flying overhead in a relatively small

area caused a real concern for U.S. commanders. The thought of losing troops in midair collisions was not a pleasant one at all.⁴⁶

The large numbers of special operations forces in the invasion force made many in the press corps believe that the SOF was there to hunt down and capture or seize Haitian military leaders. Even though many of the early press articles prior to September 19, 1994 speculate why the SOF was there, there was no specific plan to seize the military leaders. This issue was important during that time because U.S. planners were hoping to avoid the previous bad experiences in both Panama and Somalia when commanders became preoccupied with manhunts for specific leaders.⁴⁷

The SOF had specific special operations planned with respect to such things as hostage rescue, non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), and other missions requiring special skills and equipment in the forced entry option. For instance, a Navy sea-air-land (SEAL) team was positioned offshore and postured for a possible hostage rescue mission. Another 39 man SEAL team targeted the Haitian 4th Police Company who were controlling the roads approaching the Presidential Palace. This attack would have been via Army special operation MH-6 "Little Birds" that are capable of carrying special operation troops strapped to benches outside the cockpit.⁴⁸ Other special operations were planned that were generally aimed at getting control of Port-au-Prince within a matter of minutes. At that point they would turn over the targets to the conventional forces for other operations aimed at returning Haiti to peaceful control of a democratic leader.

The main targets for the invasion force were the Port-au-Prince International Airport, The National Palace, neighboring Dessalines Barracks, the Haitian 4th Police Company

Headquarters, and Camp d'Application.⁴⁹ These targets and some others were all to be part of the simultaneous takedown by the mainly special operation invasion force. During the planning of this operation, the author overheard several planners state a little saying which was adopted and used in several briefings that went some thing like this: The key to this operation is synchronicity, and violence of action with spontaneity and simultaneity.⁵⁰

Just prior to the invasion, there were special operation C-130 gunships armed with very accurate 105 millimeter howitzers and automatic weapons flying into positions ready to begin firing at targets in Port-au-Prince right at H Hour, 1:00 a.m. September 19, 1994. There were 345 U.S. Army Rangers in six C-141 aircraft preparing to conduct an airborne assault by parachute onto a deserted farm field west of Port-au-Prince to establish a forward operating base for the SOF. Two hundred and thirty five other U.S. Army Rangers were about to fly from their intermediate staging base (ISB), Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, into their target Camp d'Application, via MH-53J Pave Low Air Force special operations helicopters. This installation housed the Haitian armed forces' (FAd'H) main threat, a fifty man heavy weapons company equipped with several V-150 Commando armored cars.

Another Ranger element of 480 men was prepared to simultaneously attack the Dessalines barracks located next to the National Palace. This force was already on board the USS *America* and would fly into their target aboard eight MH-47 "Chinooks" and four MH-60 Black Hawks belonging to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) and three other "slick" CH-47s.⁵¹

The Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), made up of special operations forces from the Army, Navy, and Air Force was commanded by Major General Pete Schoomaker and headquartered aboard the USS *America*. The normal complement of Navy jets were evacuated prior to the ship departing for Haiti which made room for the 160th SOAR aircraft, U.S. Rangers, and SEAL special operation boats.⁵²

Major General William Garrison commanded the element which conducted much of the initial JSOTF planning. Multiple contingencies and redundancies were included in as much of the initial plan as possible.⁵³ In August 1994, Brigadier General Schoomaker assumed command of the element and continued the planning efforts with emphasis on safety and complete synchronization. The planning was extremely important not only for the success of the mission, but also for the safety of the special operations troops who would be the first on the ground.

Other specific keys to the success of this mission and main concerns of the commanders were safety of flight, fratricide, and the capabilities of the FAd'H, in that order.⁵⁴ The first time the author heard these concerns was when Major General Garrison stated his planning concerns at one of the very first planning meetings at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. His basis for these concerns was real. First, there would be 300 to 500 aircraft simultaneously flying over the small city of Port-au-Prince that would have to be controlled and deconflicted by time and altitude. This aspect of the plan was important and on everyone's mind due to the possibility of an aircraft going down in a shanty town or some other part of Port-au-Prince. Such an event might present a scenario like the

downed aircraft in Somalia, where after a successful SOF direct-action mission, the aircraft was hit and 18 Special Operators were killed and 75 wounded.

Second, the targets, such as the Dessalines Barracks and the National Palace were in very close proximity to each other. These particular targets were planned with several SOF elements shooting from multiple directions, which elevated the potential of fratricide. This called for three dimensional fire planning in order to prevent stray bullets from wounding or killing soldiers.

Third, the FAd'H response was not initially clear. It was relatively certain that the FAd'H would surrender after only a day or two of fighting, at most. The question was whether or not the FAd'H would hold their positions or flee to the countryside? The state of military preparedness, such as the actual conditions of the weapons and the level of training of the FAd'H, were still unknown. Although the intelligence effort was very good in many other respects, probably one of the best in recent years, information and intelligence is never good enough for commanders and planners. There is always a need for perfect intelligence, yet commanders must plan with the intelligence they have, which is not always perfect.

The importance of describing the SOF role shows the versatility of SOF to employ forces in a direct action role. This monograph will later point out how important OGAs can be to assisting SOF during these types of operations. It is also important to note that SOF later played a major role in coordinating and working with OGAs in the follow-on missions. Even though SOF had an initial "combat" mission, the change to OOTW even more so included OGAs therefore requiring close coordination.

It was also very important that this military operation be successful for other government agencies not yet involved. A safe environment and the overall security of the country was crucial to the success of many OGA's work as well. Some military targets would later become the base of some OGA operations. For instance, Camp d' Application became the school for the national police force. Initially this camp was set up by military forces. Later, the camp was turned over to another agency to carry out the tasks associated with producing trained police officers for Haiti. The next portion of this monograph will outline several of the agencies and departments involved throughout the military operation in terms of their stated roles, missions and functions.

CHAPTER 2

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES/ORGANIZATIONS

The importance of other government agencies, organizations and departments of government to military operations is paramount to the success of OOTW and other military operations. How these other organizations are integrated or not integrated into a military operation can be the success or failure of the overall operation. This is because the military, even though it succeeds in its own specific military tasks, may often find itself in charge of the overall operation and therefore responsible for many other tasks associated with the operation, including those not specifically military in nature. It is important to note however, that “military and political groups make their assessments in much different environments and often on the basis of different information” and that “Political-level authorities can hold threat perceptions much different from those held by tactical-level military commanders.”⁵⁵

Understanding the roles, methods and missions of other government agencies as well as their functions is extremely important for future commanders and planners who may find themselves in charge of just such an operation or coordinating with OGAs. U.S. military officers often find themselves coordinating or cooperating with OGAs in operations where the required tasks exceed the military capability or where the military may have to provide a safe and secure environment for other government agencies to conduct their business. This chapter focuses on those specific missions, roles and

functions of some agencies common to OOTW and military planning in general. Some organizational peculiarities and methods of operation will also be discussed to offer the reader an insight as to what some of these OGAs are and what they do in times of peace, crisis or OOTW.

Elizabeth H. Ondaatje, an International Policy Analyst for RAND since 1987, states in a report entitled "Supporting Democracy" that the "two primary challenges for coordinating complex interagency activities are coordinating policies and programs in Washington, and coordinating the implementation of those policies and programs in the host nation."⁵⁶ Her view mirrors that of many military planners and commanders when trying to coordinate in-country coordination because each organization is "an extension of an independent agency or department in Washington."⁵⁷ Each of the organizations have separate responsibilities, legislative authorities and funding programs. They also have "distinctly different expertise, assets, and interests."⁵⁸ These facts make any coordination difficult, especially with the military leading the efforts as in OOTW.

The other challenge, coordinating the in-country implementation of activities, is the responsibility of the U.S. Ambassador.⁵⁹ This problem expands when a JTF or similar military command structure is placed in charge of the military efforts and expected to coordinate OGA activities or efforts to satisfy the political objectives. The JTF or military commander must work with the Ambassador and the Country Team to coordinate the various activities. The decisions made with military influence or while the military (JTF) is in-country will carry over when the U.S. Ambassador is left with the Country Team as the JTF departs. Therefore, interagency coordination and cooperation effort is paramount.

Another challenge specifically relates to the defense intelligence requirements and economic aid programs that should never be confused.⁶⁰ For instance, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), discussed later in this monograph, should not be confused, related, or combined with intelligence gathering requirements. Any efforts USAID might implement in-country could be undermined by virtue of any relationship to intelligence gathering. "Mixing the two objectives will lead to problems" indeed.⁶¹ Potential solutions to these problems will be discussed in the next chapter.

The first organization this monograph will review is the Department of Defense (DOD). One reason this organization is first in the series of discussions is that it is the department of government that provides the military services for those type of operations discussed in this monograph. It is also a department made up of several offices and staffs. This example will help define how such organizations in the government differ from each other, especially when it comes to differences between agencies and services. The way these organizations are structured are sometimes just as important to understanding how they can impart success to a military operation or an operation where a military leader is in charge. The Department of Defense is the department of the U.S. Government that includes the military services (except the Coast Guard) that provide the military response to various political problems that may become military problems such as in Haiti, 1993. This type of response may be in the form of military action, such as combat or OOTW. The DOD may also be called upon to respond to national emergencies, such as in disaster relief operations along with OGAs. A summary of DOD's role follows:

The Department of Defense

The Department of Defense is responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.

The major elements of these forces are the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, consisting of about 1.7 million men and women on active duty. Of these, some 518,000, including about 67,000 on ships at sea, are serving outside the United States. They are backed, in case of emergency, by 1,000,000 members of the reserve components. In addition, there are about 1.1 million civilian employees in the defense Department.

Under the President, who is also Commander in Chief, the Secretary of Defense exercises authority, direction, and control over the Department, which includes the separately organized military departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff providing military advice, the unified and specified combatant commands, and various defense agencies established for specific purposes.”⁶²

With a role in government such as this, the Department of Defense should be responsible for conducting the military portion of any diplomatic crisis or military operation other than war (MOOTW) and take the lead in any campaign or series of operations or events that include other government agencies. The Department of Defense has the infrastructure, organization and resources to conduct and lead many other government agencies or organizations to success. There are two main characteristics of the Department of Defense that make it the most suitable of U.S. government organizations for a crisis response. First, the Department of Defense has a vast amount of resources, such as vehicles and the ability to sustain itself, almost anywhere in the world. Second, the Department of Defense has the professional leadership required during a crisis or other complicated situation involving military and other government aspects or organizations.

Under the Department of Defense is another agency entitled the Defense Intelligence Agency. This agency was established in 1961 to provide support to combat.⁶³

The Defense Intelligence Agency

The Defense Intelligence Agency is a combat support agency. The Agency's intelligence activities support military operations in peacetime, crisis, contingency, and combat; weapons systems acquisition and planning; and defense policymaking. To accomplish the assigned mission, DIA produces military intelligence for national foreign intelligence and couterintelligence products; coordinates all DOD intelligence collection requirements; operates the Central Measurement and Signals Intelligence (MASINT) Office; manages the Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service and the Defense Attaché System; and provides foreign intelligence and counterintelligence support to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁶⁴

The DIA is more solidly integrated with the U.S. military in peacetime, war, and during OOTW because of its role as a combat support agency than some of the other OGAs discussed in this chapter. DIA provides direct support to military operations by providing many types of intelligence products for military planners and commanders before and during military operations. One of the most important roles DIA has is to manage the Defense Attaché System which provides the link between military units (both foreign and U.S.) and the Country Team. This function is significant because the military attaché is not only an advisor to the U.S. Ambassador, but a liaison officer for military operations. Other important agencies with roles and functions that require coordination with military operations are:

Defense Logistics Agency

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) operates under the Department of Defense and provides supplies to the military services and supports their acquisition of weapons and other materiel. Support begins with joint planning with the services for parts for new weapon systems, extends through production, and concludes with the disposal of material which is obsolete, worn out, or no longer needed. The Agency provides supply support, contract administration services to all branches of the military and to a number of Federal agencies.⁶⁵

National Security Agency / Central Security Service

The National Security Agency / Central Security Service is responsible for the centralized coordination, direction, and performance of highly specialized technical functions in support of U.S. Government activities to protect U.S. communication and produce foreign intelligence information. The National Security Agency was established by Presidential directive in 1952 as a separately organized Agency within the Department of Defense. In this directive, the President designated the Secretary of Defense as executive Agent for the signals intelligence and communications security activities of the Government.⁶⁶

The Agency has two primary missions: an information systems security mission and a foreign intelligence information mission. To accomplish these missions, the Director has been assigned the following responsibilities:

- prescribing certain security principles, doctrines, and procedures for the U.S. Government.
- organizing, operating, and managing certain activities and facilities for the production of foreign intelligence information;
- organizing and coordinating the research and engineering activities of the U.S. Government that are in support of the Agency's assigned functions;
- regulating certain communications in support of Agency missions; and
- operating the National Computer Security Center in support of the Director's role as national manager for telecommunications security and automated information systems security.⁶⁷

Understanding what capabilities NSA has and how NSA can assist military operations is usually accomplished through the intelligence personnel on any given JTF staff because of the unique clearance requirements and techniques used by NSA. The support products NSA provides and other highly specialized technical functions were extremely important during the planning of operations in Haiti.

The Department of Justice

The Department of Justice serves as counsel for the citizens of the United States as the Nations largest law firm. It represents them in enforcing the law in the public interest. Through its thousands of lawyers, investigators, and agents, the Department plays the key role in protection against criminals and subversion, in ensuring healthy competition of business in our free enterprise system, in safeguarding the consumer, and in enforcing drug, immigration, and naturalization laws. The Department also

plays a significant role in protecting citizens through its efforts for effective law enforcement, crime prevention, crime detection, and prosecution and rehabilitation of offenders.

Moreover, the Department conducts all suits in the Supreme Court in legal matters generally, rendering legal advice and opinions, upon request, to the President and to the heads of the executive departments. The Attorney General supervises and directs these activities, as well as those of the U.S. attorneys and U.S. marshals in the various judicial districts around the country.⁶⁸

Under the Department of Justice there are three organizations in particular that this monograph will address, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). These are three of the most common organizations within the Department of Justice a military commander works with during times of crisis. The relationship between the Department of Justice and the military may include operations either within the continental boundaries of the United States or overseas.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the principal investigative arm of the United States Department of Justice. It is charged with gathering and reporting facts, locating witnesses, and compiling evidence in cases involving Federal jurisdiction.⁶⁹

The FBI works five prioritized areas that affect society the most: organized crime/drugs, counterterrorism, white-collar crime, foreign counterintelligence, and violent crime.⁷⁰ Several of these areas are common to military OOTW within the U.S. borders. Recently, in some situations the FBI and U.S. military have worked together in overseas operations as well. Examples of these coordinated operations are: Vietnam, Mexico, and several Eastern European countries.⁷¹ The FBI organizational structure is similar to the military organizational structure and operating procedures. For instance, "the famed (FBI) hostage rescue team (HRT) is now bound to well defined (operational) objectives (like the

military) and must adhere to rules of engagement similar to those that the military employs.”⁷² “The interagency cooperation and coordination between the military and the FBI has become closer and more clearly defined, especially in the counternarcotics arena.”⁷³

Immigration and Naturalization Service

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) provides the following mission responsibilities:

- facilitating entry of those legally admissible as visitors or immigrants to the United States;
- granting benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, including providing assistance to those seeking asylum, temporary or permanent resident status, or naturalization;
- preventing improper entry and the granting of benefits to those not legally entitled to them;
- apprehending and removing those aliens who enter or remain illegally in the United States and/or whose stay is not in the public interest; and
- Enforcing sanctions against those who act or conspire to subvert the requirements for selective and controlled entry, including sanction against employers who knowingly hire aliens not authorized to work in the United States.

Issues dealing with the so called “Haitian Migration,” as it was commonly referred to by military planners, were worked between INS and military planners. The migration of Haitians trying to avoid the tyranny in Haiti presented a problem for not only the U.S. policy makers, but the U.S. military as well. The agency best suited for the systematic migration problems is the INS. Through coordination and cooperation with the military and others, the INS processed and eventually repatriated many Haitians as described in Chapter 1.

Drug Enforcement Administration

“The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the lead Federal Agency in enforcing narcotics and controlled substances laws and the regulations.”⁷⁴

The Administration's responsibilities include:

- investigation of major narcotic violators who operate at interstate and international levels;
- seizure and forfeiture of assets derived from, traceable to, or intended to be used for illicit drug trafficking;
- enforcement of regulations governing the legal manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances;
- management of a national narcotics intelligence system;
- coordination with Federal, State, and local law enforcement authorities and cooperation with counterpart agencies abroad; and
- training, scientific research, and information exchange in support of drug traffic prevention and control.⁷⁵

The DEA operates and maintains "offices throughout the United States and in 50 foreign countries."⁷⁶

The Department of State

The Department of State (DOS) is the main organization in most overseas military or OGA operations. The DOS presence in country normally employs the Chief of Mission, usually someone with the rank of Ambassador, as the direct representative of the President and head of the Country Team in an embassy or consulate. Sometimes the DOS representative can be an ambassadorial representative or envoy where the U.S. may not have an actual embassy or consulate. Many problems or situations overseas begin with various types of OGA operations in support of U.S. diplomatic or policy objectives before it becomes a military operation. Haiti was a good example of this. There were many different programs, actions and operations being conducted by OGAs well before the U.S. or United Nations got involved with military action, all coordinated by the DOS. As the problem developed in Haiti, coordination with the Country Team and specifically the DOS became very important with respect to military planners and leaders. Who is charge of

what becomes a critical point of discussion between the National Command Authority, the Ambassador and military leaders. The official role of the DOS is as follows:

The Department of State advises the President in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. As Chief Executive, the President has overall responsibility for the foreign policy of the United States. The Department of State's primary objective in the conduct of foreign relations is to promote the long-range security and well-being of the United States. The Department determines and analyzes the facts relating to American overseas interests, makes recommendation on policy and future action, and takes the necessary steps to carry out established policy. In so doing, the Department engages in continuous consultations with the American public, the Congress, other U.S. departments and agencies, and foreign governments; negotiates treaties and agreements with foreign nations; speaks for the United States in the United Nations and in more than 50 major international organizations in which the United States participates; and represents the United states at more than 800 international conferences annually.⁷⁷

The United States Coast Guard

"The Coast Guard is a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States at all times and is a service of the Navy in time of war or when the President directs."⁷⁸

Since 1790, when the Revenue Marine, predecessor to the Coast Guard, was established as the Federal maritime law enforcement agency, many responsibilities have been added.⁷⁹ These additional activities include search and rescue, maritime law enforcement, marine inspection, maritime licensing, marine environmental response, port safety and security, waterways management, aids to navigation, bridge administration, ice operations, deep water ports, boating safety, Coast Guard Auxiliary, military readiness, reserve training, and Marine Safety Council.⁸⁰

A lesser known agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is an agency whose importance during domestic crises can be critical. The U.S. Military must coordinate extensively with FEMA during military support to such disasters as hurricane or flood relief operations. FEMA does not usually operate overseas or with operations

concerning the military. However, the importance of understanding FEMA and having a plan to coordinate with them is important during domestic crises.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

The Federal Emergency Management Agency is the central agency within the Federal Government for emergency planning, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. Working closely with State and local governments, the Agency funds emergency programs, offers technical guidance and training, and deploys Federal resources in times of catastrophic disaster. These coordinated activities ensure a broad-based program to protect life and property and provide recovery assistance after a disaster.⁸¹

The activities under the responsibility of FEMA are: response and recovery, preparedness, training, and exercises, fire prevention and training, operations support, mitigation programs, information technology services, executive direction, and regional offices.⁸²

Another agency that may be already in country and operating through coordination with the DOS is the Peace Corps. Many times the Peace Corps will already be set up and working before military forces arrive. Thus, the need for coordination with the Peace Corps. The Peace Corps role is as follows:

Peace Corps

The Peace Corps' purpose is to promote world peace and friendship, to help other countries in meeting their needs for trained men and women, and to promote understanding between the American people and other peoples served by the Peace Corps. The Peace Corps Act emphasizes the Peace Corps commitment toward programming to meet the basic needs of those living in the countries where volunteers work.⁸³

At higher levels of the JTF or even above the JTF level, coordination must take place with agencies that develop policy. One such organization is The United States International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA).

The United States International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA)

The United States International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) was established by Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1979 (5 U.S.C. app., effective October 1, 1979) to be a focal point within the U.S. Government for economic matters affecting U.S. relations with developing countries. The Agency's functions are policy planning, policymaking, and policy coordination on international economic issues affecting developing countries. The Director of the Agency serves as the principal international development adviser to the President and the Secretary of State, receiving foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. The U.S. Agency for International Development and the Overseas Private Investment Cooperation are component agencies of the U.S. International Development Cooperation Agency.⁸⁴

The United States Agency for International Development

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) administers U.S. foreign economic and humanitarian assistance programs worldwide in the developing world, Central and Eastern Europe, and the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union. The Agency functions under an Administrator, who concurrently serves as the Acting Director of IDCA.⁸⁵

One of the most common agencies that consistently work with the military is the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA role is as follows:

The Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) collects, evaluates, and disseminates vital information on political, military, economic, scientific, and other developments abroad needed to safeguard national security.⁸⁶

The CIA, under the direction of the President or the National Security Council:

- advises the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;
- makes recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;
- correlates and evaluates intelligence relating to the national security and provides for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government;
- collects, produces, and disseminates counterintelligence and foreign intelligence, including information not otherwise obtainable. The collection of counterintelligence or foreign intelligence within the United States shall be coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director

of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;

- collects, produces, and disseminates intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking;

- conducts counterintelligence activities outside the United States and without assuming or performing any internal security functions, conducts counterintelligence activities within the United States in coordination with the FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;

- coordinates counterintelligence activities and the collection of information not otherwise obtainable when conducted outside the United States by other departments and agencies;

- conducts special activities approved by the President. No agency, except the Central Intelligence Agency (or the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.)), may conduct any special activity unless the President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective;

- carries out or contracts for research, development, and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized functions;

- protects the security of its installation, activities, information, property, and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the Agency, as are necessary;

- collects, produces, and disseminates military intelligence to military commands to enhance battlefield awareness;

- conducts such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform its functions, including procurement and essential cover and proprietary arrangements; and

- performs such other functions and duties relating to intelligence that affect the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

The Agency has no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.⁸⁷

The government agencies and organizations discussed above are an integral part of many military operations other than war and combat operations. As in Haiti and in the future, these and other organizations will continue to conduct operations of their own alongside military operations. If the future mimics the recent past, coordination between the military and OGAs will be even more necessary and prevalent both overseas and inside the U.S. borders. In the past, the military commanders have been tasked to coordinate the

activities of the OGAs closely with military operations. Fully understanding the nature of each of these organizations is only the first step in solving this complex problem. How to best conduct the operation with all of the different force structures, rules of engagements, policies, procedures, and other complexities OGAs bring with them is most often the goal of the military commander. With the help of the Country Team and others, this task can be accomplished, but not without difficulty under current military doctrine. A specific planning process is required so military commanders and OGAs can facilitate the coordination process and reach the desired end state of full cooperation. The next chapter will present a process designed by the author to facilitate coordinations between OGAs and military planners.

CHAPTER 3

THE CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

Just how do all of these organizations, with their own roles, functions, missions, agendas, and different legislative authorities, coordinate under a U.S. military leader with a military mission, organization, role and function? The answer is not an easy one and requires some analysis in order to explore the considerations of each of the organizations. This assumes that the operation is under military control or leadership. Most often, and especially in Haiti, this was exactly the case. As described in Chapter 1, a military commander was indeed put in charge initially, along with an Ambassador from DOS, of the overall operation. Obviously, the first coordination had to be with DOS to coordinate what activities the military would be responsible for and which ones the Ambassador would be responsible for. The military has a process for decision making and other guides for coordination between military forces, such as coalitions, or combined operations with other countries, but not for interagency operations.

During the military planning process, planners should search for commonalities so they can best coordinate the many different types of organizations and execute the operation as one force towards success. What is needed is a planning process that incorporates the characteristics of each of the organizations and an understanding of what each brings to the military operation.

One of the very first problems, not only on the military side, but on the agency side of the debate over how to solve these problems, is terminology. One author suggests calling these activities “noncombat” operations instead of “nontraditional” or “nonmilitary.”⁸⁸ “This term ensures that they are not perceived as any less a traditional, military responsibility than warfighting.”⁸⁹ Ondaatje recognizes the fact that such activities as “humanitarian assistance or drug interdiction may fall into a “gray area” because they can escalate from noncombat to combat operations and back again.”⁹⁰ The problem is that many different names for the gray areas exist such as “aggregated roles” or “rapidly shifting roles” and Ondaatje states these should be consolidated into a common vocabulary in an effort to “bridge the gap between the two sides of the debate on the future of U.S. military noncombat activities.”⁹¹

Generally during a military operation and most often in OOTW, as the military defines these activities, the military commander is titled as a Joint Task Force (JTF) commander because he commands forces from other services, thus fulfilling the joint definition.⁹² Although there are other ways the military can organize for OOTW, most often a JTF is formed for these types of operations meeting a limited number of objectives with more specialized considerations. This was the case in Haiti. When other government organizations are involved in a crisis situation, where a military commander is placed in charge of the overall operation, his title remains the same, yet he is responsible for coordinating and incorporating the OGAs into or in support of the overall operation. In some instances, the military may be supporting an OGA with its mission. And yet in other cases, the military may find itself executing the duties of an OGA that cannot execute its

own mission because of the characteristics of the crisis situation. For instance, usually the Department of State Diplomatic Security section would be the choice governmental organization for establishing a foreign police force in times of crisis. However, in Haiti, the U.S. Military actually conducted this operation.

The military commander must have a thorough understanding of the OGAs in terms of organization, resources, actual charter and their specified tasks from their higher headquarters. The case study of operations in Haiti shows that because of the large scope of operations, it is imperative that military planners and leaders fully understand the characteristics of the OGAs in order to effectively coordinate their activities. Other than the general education most officers have about OGAs, specific details are not taught to JTF commanders or their staffs and they often learn about OGAs through experience in past operations. Although this technique is a very good one, emphasis on more formal education about OGAs may benefit future JTF commanders.

Ondaatje suggests that a possible solution to the interagency problem of “coordination in Washington is a nemesis,” mainly because “it will always be difficult to orchestrate all the various participants, both public and private, from Washington.”⁹³ Her solution begins with the lessons learned from Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada and Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama that clearly show the “desperate need for interagency cooperation whether engaged in crises or in the ongoing business of supporting democracy.”⁹⁴ The first step in her solution is the recognition of the fact that the OGAs have a role to play in this area.

Another potential solution to the problem “involves the Policy Coordinating Committees (PCC) run by the Assistant Secretaries of State to coordinate interagency activities in Washington.”⁹⁵ Her view is that even though these Committees work well when considering specific problems; “they are not as effective for coordinating sustained operations in a country and cannot compare in effectiveness with the Country Teams.”⁹⁶ Again, she does not dismiss the fact that this too is difficult. But, the ultimate body to address problems and proposals for appropriate solutions for interagency coordination rests with the National Security Council.

Another part of the problem stated above, the planning process, is where this monograph will focus a little more attention. Throughout the case study in Chapter 1 of this monograph, one can see where OGAs played an important role in the overall operation or where OGAs should have played an important role in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. In order to best incorporate the capabilities of the OGAs into military plans, the military must have a process for doing so. The U.S. Army has a deliberate decision making process (DDMP) that provides guidance for the steps involved in decision making and planning military operations.⁹⁷ Although this process is valid and works well for military planning, it does not specifically address OGAs and their capabilities. A similar, yet separate process may be more helpful for military planners when it comes to OGA planning, coordination, or integration into a military operation other than war.

The proposed process includes four planning steps to achieve the best possible coordination and integration of OGAs in military operations. If used in the same way as the DDMP or in unison, this process will ensure a more completely coordinated plan that

incorporates the capabilities of the different OGAs with the military operations thus providing a more useful avenue towards success.

This proposed process involves the following four steps: Guidance Development, Capability Assessment, Integration and Resourcing, and Program Assessment.⁹⁸ The first step involves similar characteristics to those of mission analysis in the DDMP. The mission analysis step consists of gathering the facts, making assumptions, analyzing the higher headquarters mission and intent of the operation. It also includes issuing commander's guidance to subordinates and OGA colleagues to focus subsequent staff planning and coordination.⁹⁹ During first step in this proposed process, the development of specific guidance for the military and OGAs is very important. The prudent planner incorporates the OGAs and military units in the process and does not conduct planning in a vacuum utilizing solely military channels and input to the process. Identifying the objectives of the operation, and knowing and fully understanding the goals that have to be met is probably the first critical hurdle toward success.

The commander must fully understand the higher commander's intent and begin at once to identify the essential tasks that all of the OGAs and the military must complete to perform a successful mission. The analysis includes an analysis of the operational area, including the security assessment, weather, in-country available assets such as roads, railways and ports, and many other considerations peculiar to the operation. Specified and implied tasks that must be accomplished also require delineation. Limitations, restrictions, and constraints on the operation must be identified that may influence the accomplishment of the tasks. A risk assessment is also conducted during this step to determine the level of

risk a commander may accept or reject. Another important part of this step involves the determination of critical facts and assumptions which can directly affect mission success. As with any planning, time analysis is critical to success and must also be part of this step. This step concludes with a concise restated mission statement defining who will conduct what, when, where and why. This mission statement is the agreed upon or dictated mission from the commander to military units and coordinated with the OGAs as a specific goal or goals for them to accomplish. The mission statement provides specific guidance and when combined with the commander's intent, provides the direction required for execution of the operation. Since a commander does not "command" OGAs, the mission statement must be coordinated with them or at least agreed and approved by the OGAs before execution begins. The mission statement to OGAs have several important purposes. First, one must make sure that the specified mission relates to the military objectives. Second, the missions of OGAs and the military should at least complement each other in terms of outcome and execution. Third, the mission statement should describe the proposed activities and planners should ensure they are phased or synchronized to avoid failure in inconsistent execution or the overall goal.

The second step in this process is Capability Assessment. Within this portion of the process an analysis of specific capabilities for each supporting agency are outlined and identified. The advantages and disadvantages of each of the capabilities and unique strengths and weaknesses of each of the capabilities are measured and assessed in order to determine the best agency or organization for the best result of whatever the task may be. Even though many organizations have similar and sometimes redundant capabilities,

through thorough analysis one may find that a particular agency can achieve the desired result better than another and possibly more easily or more efficiently. During this step one should also determine the information and intelligence requirements that impact the operation or the OGA operations within the overall operation. Many times the military structure, in terms of intelligence, can assist the OGAs in their operations and vice versa.

In this step, a thorough planner will identify logistics requirements such as number of personnel, special equipment, time, transportation, authorization or approval processes, limitations, interagency agreements, and the ramifications of one agency activity on another. For instance, the potential impact of military operations on humanitarian activities.

While assessing the OGAs and the operation during this step, it is also important to remain unbiased. There is no room for preconceived notions about an organization or OGA during this step. A commander and staff must review the information with the overall mission and objective in mind. It is important that they avoid any influences from external host country pressures, the Country Team or any other influences that may impact the capability assessment process. It is usually best for the agencies themselves to provide the information and accurate internal capabilities assessment of the current situation for planning instead of relying on advertised capabilities that may only apply to particular situations.

Integration and resourcing is the next step in this process and calls for the commander and staff to analyze the fiscal guidance and potential cost estimates of the activities associated with the operation. They must also ensure prudent expenditures of

funding for those activities. The purpose of this step is to review the cost of the operation in terms of what each of the agencies and organizations can contribute or are willing to contribute toward the overall success. Often, an agency or organization is restricted to limited funding for a particular operation. This step identifies those financial limitations and provides the commander the opportunity to possibly reallocate resources to achieve the desired results by using similar military capabilities or an OGA capability better financially suited for a particular activity. For instance, in Haiti the military provided some security for OGAs operating in and around the Light Industrial Complex (LIC) and other facilities, thus avoiding the cost of hiring private security.

The integration of the OGAs into the overall operation is determined in this step as well. Once the commander and staff have a good understanding of the mission, the capabilities and the amount of money along with any other resources and limitations that may apply, the planners can determine and present the best course of action to the commander for approval. This course of action, much like any military operation, should be thorough and well developed. Some characteristics of a good plan are that it meets the stated requirements, it should also be complete, flexible, feasible, suitable or acceptable to the OGAs, and have distinguishable options for the commander.

The final step of this process is an ongoing one of program assessment. This step continues to assess the operation in terms of new activities that may have developed, changing financial constraints, political or policy changes, and capabilities or other characteristics of the operation that change and require further assessment or the need for developing branch plans or sequels to the existing plan to ensure success of the overall

operation. During this step, a planner should determine the most workable solutions based on analysis and the current situation, constantly looking to the future for early successes or potential problems or failures.

None of the characteristics described above are new. Most of the considerations are part of the DDMP or other military planning guidelines, processes, or taught as part of some military planning system to ensure that complete planning takes place. What makes this monograph different is that these same characteristics are put into a format for commanders and planners to specifically plan military operations with interagency support or with OGAs. Military planners seem to like checklist type manuals and acronyms to help guide them in their work. It is sometimes more efficient because planners can use acronyms or quick reference guides to ensure completeness in their work. The acronym "GCIP" can be used to describe the steps in this process. This four step process is simply an example or potential solution to the interagency problem. Planners might build upon this model and add another step or specific characteristics, considerations, aspects, information or change the sequence of the steps to fit the particular situation or operation.

The model is not only a tool for military planners considering interagency operations. It should be part of an OGA's planning sequence or planning considerations through their military liaison teams or personnel. If used, OGAs will be better prepared to assist military planners or be ready to integrate their planning cell with the military or vice versa. The importance of this model is that when the planning process begins, the required information is exchanged and both the military and OGAs are more prepared to execute their portion safely and successfully.

How did this interagency relationship work or not work in Haiti, 1993 to 1995?

Generally, throughout the after action reports on the military side and in articles or reports on the OGA side, the success story of the operation overrode any real problematic areas. It is not the intent of this monograph to research and try to find problems with the other agencies or organizations. The purpose is to show that a process or model for coordination between the military and OGAs is needed. Taking the actions as described in chapter 1 of this monograph as an historic example, the author will connect the history with the proposed model and show how and where the model may have helped or where the model can be used in the future.

During JTF 120 operations in 1993, several agencies were involved with the military. The U.S. Coast Guard, CIA, and DIA, were just a few of the many agencies working as a team in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY . The capabilities of these organizations were discussed and integrated into the operation where appropriate. One problem noted by the author was the lack of continuity on the part of the military, specifically while on board the USS *NASSAU* with the DIA. In particular, the type of computer system used aboard the command ship had to be upgraded and work-arounds had to be figured out so as to accommodate the most efficient transfer of DIA support directly to the military planners on the ship. Step two in the model "Capability Assessment" may have been the answer. If an assessment of the actual capabilities were done in the initial planning process, the problem might have been avoided.

OGA and military relationships during the JTF 120 period were very good in terms of cooperation. The relationship with the CIA was a very strong one from the beginning

and it seems as a result of the success of the operations in Haiti, the overall relationship between the U.S. military and CIA is a better one today.¹⁰⁰ Another example of good cooperation between two separate organizations was the U.S. Navy interaction with the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard assigned a liaison (LNO) to the JTF as a focal point for coordination and the JTF maintained good communication channels with the higher headquarters, usually the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon, ACOM or with the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince, to ensure a solid relationship. The interaction between the Navy and the Coast Guard is probably an effective one because throughout history the Coast Guard and Navy have worked together and are in fact similar organizations, even though they work for two different Departments of the U.S. Government in peacetime. In wartime, the USCG become part of the Navy and expand their coastal defense types operations to include Navy support where required.

The interaction between the INS and the U.S. Department of Defense, mainly the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), worked to solve the immigrant problem and “Haitian migration” discussed earlier in this monograph. This relationship seemed to be a good example of interagency cooperation and coordination as well. Good, because the goals were identified and they supported the President’s policy on the Haitian migrant interdiction at sea. It was also a good relationship because together, the INS and USMC developed and implemented a procedure for processing Haitians for either entry into the U.S. or repatriation back to Haiti. The two organizations also worked together to set procedures to hold and process Haitians in various sites such as Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba.¹⁰¹ The Marines (SPMAGTF) on board the USS *NASSAU* were the ground and air

forces that assisted the mainly U.S. Naval Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) and worked closely with the Country Team concerning the NEO and other potential contingency operations.¹⁰²

There was no specific model or process for the Marines to use at the time that covered the details of interagency coordination and planning process. The Marines used the typical military operations planning method and decision making process that seemed sufficient at the time. With the author's proposed model, more detail and more efficient use of time and resources may have made a difference in the coordination process and potentially the execution phase of a NEO, if executed.

One specific aspect of the detailed coordination for the execution phase of a NEO in Port-au-Prince was the communications compatibility between the Country Team and the Marines. As a planner, the author as well as others were concerned with the compatibility and types of radios used by the Marines that differed from those the Country Team had initially. A planning model such as GCIP may have identified the communications concern and potentially saved time or eliminated a problem if the NEO had to be executed earlier than expected. A planning model might have also identified other potential problems or solutions.

Another potential use of a GCIP type planning model for interagency operations was the failed Haitian Assistance and Advisory Group (HAAG) mission as the USS *HARLAN COUNTY* pulled up to and then quickly departed Port-au-Prince in October, 1993. A planning process that incorporated the Country Team, OGAs and possibly the CIA and other intelligence organizations might have identified the potential problem at the dock

and thus thwarted the humiliating experience for the HAAG. There is not much written specifically about the coordination process, if any was used, between the HAAG and the Country Team and others to ensure success. At first glance, it seems that if a better coordination effort or process such as the GCIP were used, the results may have been much different.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

This monograph shows why a model that facilitates military planning and coordination with OGAs is important to the success of future military operations and how it is especially important to operations other than war. Whether these operations are like those in Haiti, or in times of domestic crises, such as a natural disaster, or whether the operations are conducted overseas in combat operations, a planning model is needed for both military planners and OGAs. A model that guides the planning process and sets the stage for coordination and cooperation between the different organizations should be part of doctrine not only in the Army, but in Joint Operations doctrine also. As discussed in this monograph, the military DDMP is not sufficient for military planning or coordinating is conducted with OGAs. A specific process employable by both the military planners and OGAs is necessary to ensure the complete coordination and understanding of what agency will conduct what activities, what actions they will take, and a process that assigns responsibility for the various programs, actions or operations, including financial support.

U.S. military doctrine does not identify the steps required to define how to coordinate an interagency operation sufficiently to ensure success in operations other than war or combat operations. Most often, interagency operations are thought to occur in OOTW and the DDMP is applied to the planning process and planners try and fit OGAs

into the process. Most, if not all, current U.S. military operations are interagency operations or multi-agency operations. Without the proper model for complete integration and coordination between the military and the OGAs, this planning effort becomes difficult at best.

The case study of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in this monograph outlines several specifics about the need for an interagency coordination process. First, this operation was a military led operation that began after many other agencies and organizations were already working. This required coordination and cooperation between the military and the OGAs prior to the start of military operations. Second, the complexity of the operation shows how difficult it can be to maneuver military forces over land, at sea and in the air, never mind trying to incorporate OGAs that have different purposes and methods in many different locations. Third, the overall timeline of the actions in Haiti shows how some agencies or organizations were present prior to the military forces landing. Therefore, they might inadvertently interfere with planned military actions or in fact, might be able to assist the military efforts by providing information or other support.

Military planners know and understand the importance of synchronization with respect to conventional military operations, Joint Operations, Special Operations and Combined Operations. They also understand the significance of OGAs and the necessity to synchronize the activities of these organizations toward overall success. In order to synchronize the activities, it requires close coordination and cooperation between the military and OGAs.

Chapter 2 of this monograph explored some of the most common OGAs with respect to military operations and specifically some of those associated with Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. This is the first step in the solution to a better coordinated effort. A full understanding of exactly who and what each of these organizations are is probably the most important part in finding a solution to better coordination. It is very important to understand how these organizations work as well, not just in the day to day operations, but how they get things done in Washington.

The author developed the GCIP in Chapter 3 as an example and a potential solution to the interagency problem. The GCIP process provides the framework or model to coordinate the different organizations under a military commander so as to ensure success of the overall operation. It is a tool for the military and the OGAs to use when planning activities or operations under a military commander or between each other. The process is concise, uncomplicated, and if used as described above, complete. This one process is also as easily used by military planners as OGA planners. The goal of GCIP is complete coordination toward efficient execution of a military operation as well as OGA activities synchronized toward overall operational success. The GCIP was designed with the main assumption of this monograph in mind; the military will be in charge of the overall operation including both military forces and to some extent, OGAs.

The process is also valid when coordinating activities with the DOS in country or simply between two OGAs working in the same area or toward the same goal. In this case, the sharing of the first and second steps of GCIP can be valuable in understanding the current situation.

The GCIP process is not locked in stone and may not fit all situations. However, if used by planners, the GCIP can provide the basis for overall success in many situations, especially in terms of military operations, such as those in Haiti. If these four steps are modified to fit a particular situation, it will not necessarily degrade the applicability of the process or result. The important point is that military and OGAs use a system that is agreeable and one that is practicable and leads to overall success.

It is recommended that the Department of Defense review this process and incorporate the GCIP model in its doctrine and in any interagency operation training to military and/or OGA personnel. The result of having the GCIP in doctrine and in the hands of the OGAs for planning will ensure better interagency coordination in the future and should lead to better interagency cooperation during military crisis action planning.

ENDNOTES

¹FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army June 1993), Glossary-3.

²FM 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army December 1994), iv-v.

³*Ibid.*, v.

⁴See the series of TRADOC messages from December 1995 to the present on this subject.

⁵Several high ranking officers have stated during visits (1996-1997) to The Command and General College that the term OOTW is too well established to change at this point and that the Army will recommend the term continue as a reference to non-combat operations.

⁶From discussions with officers at the Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS who are writing future doctrine, specifically FM 100-5.

⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-03.32, *Combat Support Agency Assessment System* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 29 January 1993) describes the guidelines and procedures for operating the Combat Support Agency Assessment System (CSAAS) in times of war or threat of national security.

⁸Wayne A. Downing, General, "New National Security Challenges," in *Managing Contemporary Conflict, Pillars of Success*, ed., Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olson (Boulder, Co: Westview, 1996), 93.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, I-1.

¹²United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, *Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR*, United States Atlantic Command (Norfolk, VA: United States Atlantic Command, 1995), 2.

¹³Eric Schmitt, "Unique Union of Soldiers and Sailors," *The New York Times* (17 September, 1994), 6.

¹⁴United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, *Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR*, 2.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁸The author joined JTF 120 on 18 October 1993 as a planner for contingency plans calling for special operations and observed much of the overall planning for the MIO.

¹⁹As a member of the JTF 120 staff from 18 October to 23 November 1993, onboard the USS *Nassau* (LHA 4), the author observed the planning and execution of this joint mission mainly between the U.S. Navy and the Special Purpose Marine Amphibious Task Force (SPMAGTF) for the MIO and other contingency operations. The Army and Air Force maintained liaison officers (LNOs) and planners for short periods of time to coordinate planning.

²⁰United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, *Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR*, 2.

²¹The author obtained the information regarding the impact of the embargo on Haitians and the Haitian government from a series of informal briefings and coordinations made with the Atlantic Command (ACOM) staff in Norfolk, VA in September through December 1994.

²²United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, *Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR*, 6.

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴"Attaches" wrongly refers to only members of pseudo-auxiliary police (usually young males) that were used as a strong arm to maintain control in the city streets usually by violence. Attaches were also workers, both men and women, who cooked, worked, or did chores and were "attached," paid or managed by the police.

²⁵ United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, *Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR*, 7.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., 8.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., 9.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid. The purposes of broadcasting "Radio democracy" via EC-130 were to educate and prepare the Haitians for the U.S. and Multinational military force.

³² Ibid., 10.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., 11.

³⁶ From a reading assignment during classes in the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) in 1995, Adam B. Siegel, "The Intervention in Haiti," Paper, 2.

³⁷ United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, *Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR*, 11.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., 12.

⁴⁰ Caption from the back of an official photo of the USS *America* presented to the author by a commander within the USSOCOM.

⁴¹ United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, *Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR*, 12.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ed Offley, "Last Minute Change Puts the Rangers on Hold," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 20 September 1994, 10.

⁴⁵Sean Naylor, "The Invasion That Never Was," *The Army Times, The Independent Weekly*, 26 February 1996, 12.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid., 14.

⁴⁹Ibid., 16.

⁵⁰This phrase became a popular one in and around the SOF community and the Pentagon. Many high ranking officers used the phrase to express the importance of the quickness and completeness of the overall invasion that would occur in many places at once within Port-au-Prince.

⁵¹Naylor, "The Invasion That Never Was," *The Army Times, The Independent Weekly*, 26 February 1996, 12-13. The term "slick" or "vanilla" is sometimes used to distinguish general purpose force equipment or aircraft from special operation or "black" equipment.

⁵²Ibid., 13.

⁵³Ibid., 14.

⁵⁴Ibid., 16.

⁵⁵Joseph F. Bouchard, *Command In Crisis, Four Case Studies*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 209.

⁵⁶Elizabeth H. Ondaatje, Moderator and Rapporteur *Supporting Democracy* in James R. Graham, ed., *Non-Combat Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993), 75.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid., 76.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid., 77.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Office of the Federal Register, *The United States Government Manual, 1996-97*, Office of the Federal Register, National Archive and Records Administration (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 174.

⁶³Ibid., 229.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Ibid., 231.

⁶⁶Ibid., 236.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Ibid., 329.

⁶⁹Ibid., 349.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Lynn Tremaine, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Minneapolis Office, interview by Maj Robert C. Shaw, 27 March 1997, Minneapolis, MN.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Office of the Federal Register, *The United States Government Manual, 1996-97*, 353.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid., 354.

⁷⁷Ibid., 390.

⁷⁸Ibid., 415.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid., 415-417.

⁸¹Ibid., 533.

⁸²Ibid., 533-535.

⁸³Ibid., 643.

⁸⁴Ibid., 694.

⁸⁵Ibid., 697.

⁸⁶Ibid., 490.

⁸⁷Ibid., 490-491.

⁸⁸Ondaatje, Moderator and Rapporteur *supporting Democracy* in James R. Graham, ed., *Non-Combat Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era*, 87.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²FM 100-5, *Operations*, 4-1.

⁹³Ibid., 77

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷ST 101-5, *Command and Staff Processes* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, February 1996), 1-5.

⁹⁸The titles for these steps were adapted from the USSOCOM Strategic Planning Process which is a five step process integrating strategic input toward a program outlining operations support, resourcing, and acquisition, a much different use of these terms than

this author intends. This five step process was briefed by a member of USSOCOM at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas as part of the Advanced Special Operations Course in 1997.

⁹⁹ST 101-5, 2-1.

¹⁰⁰The author observed the relationship between the CIA, Office of Military Support and the Army grow to one of much better cooperation after the operations in Haiti. The section within the CIA that provides military support incorporated the military planners and other specific individuals for follow-on military operations. They worked out a sort of liaison improvement program that assists military planners in fulfilling requirements and overall it improved the process of coordination and cooperation between the two organizations.

¹⁰¹United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, *Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR*, 2.

¹⁰²Colonel Schmidt, the Marine Commander of 2-2 Marines at the time, and the JTF staff held a meeting with members of the U.S. Country Team from Haiti at sea, on board the USS *NASSAU* to specifically coordinate the details for a non-combatant evacuation plan and other contingency operations being considered. This meeting really began the close working relationship between the two groups and set the stage for future cooperation.

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